Timeline Released in IRP6 Case Supports Allegations that Mueller's FBI Raided Colorado Company to Steal Software
Denver, CO -- (ReleaseWire) -- 05/21/2018 --Advocacy organization A Just Cause (AJC) has released a timeline of events showing that a February 9, 2005 FBI raid on Colorado Springs company IRP Solutions (and subsequent wrongful prosecution and conviction its executives) was possibly done for the sole purpose of stealing their innovative "Case Investigative Life Cycle or CILC (pronounced "silk") software.
AJC says the FBI fraudulently obtained a search warrant by blatantly lying in an affidavit to Denver federal magistrate judge Craig Schaffer that IRP was a "purported software development company." Former federal appeals judge H. Lee Sarokin agrees, telling the Washington Post that the IRP executives were "indicted and imprisoned for not paying their bills" and was "amazed" that the government claimed CILC was a "scam" when "all the proof in the case goes the opposite way."
Washington Post Article - http://www.wapo.st/29jXqSC
Dr. Alan Bean, Executive Director of the Friends of Justice, who conducted a six-month investigation into the case, described in a 2013 report how the FBI and Colorado U.S. Attorney's Office concocted a bizarre "bogus business theory" to fraudulently gain an indictment that was ultimately used to wrongly convict and imprison the IRP executives.
"The IRP case departs from the typical failed-scam scenario for the simplest of reasons: the government's case can't stand up to scrutiny," said Bean. "The fraud alleged in the federal indictments is a mirage," added Bean. "The bogus business theory is bogus," exclaimed Bean.
"What would motivate the FBI falsify a search warrant affidavit and lie to a federal judge to raid IRP Solutions, " asks Lamont Banks, Executive Director of A Just Cause. "Why did the FBI spend 13 hours at IRP offices on the day of the raid imaging every single hard drive in the business when the warrant authorized them to only seize financial records?" questions Banks. "Because they were trying to steal CILC," answers Banks. "The FBI was found culpable in 9/11 terror attacks because of their outdated case management software led to information sharing failures and wanted CILC," contends Banks.
Prior to raiding IRP in 2005, the FBI was reeling from controversy and congressional scrutiny for information sharing and operational failures caused by their antiquated case management software -- failures that the 9/11 Commission found contributed to the deaths of 3000 Americans from the 9/11 Al Qaeda terror attacks.
Between 2001 and 2005, FBI Director Robert Mueller was failing miserably at modernizing the Bureau's archaic Automated Case Support (ACS) system and was being excoriated by members of Congress for wasting nearly $400 million dollars on the failed Virtual Case Files (VCF) project that was paid to Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) to replace ACS.
In December 2002, Mueller asked and received an additional $123 million dollars from Congress for the failing VCF project. By March 2004 Mueller told Congress in a hearing that VCF would be operational by the summer but did not deliver. In May 2004, however, a desperate Mueller agreed to pay SAIC another $16 million to help salvage the project while simultaneously discussing scrapping VCF in favor of another solution.
By June 2004 Mueller paid the Aerospace Corporation $2 million to review VCF. Aerospace concluded that VCF was incomplete, inadequate and so poorly designed that it would be unusable under real world conditions. Aerospace Corp. also found that in rudimentary tests, VCF did not comply with basic requirements. VCF was an utter failure and Mueller was desperate for answers. Mueller would soon learn from Department of Homeland Security (DHS) how CILC could help solve the FBI's case management woes when they joined with DHS as part of the Federal Investigative Case Management System (FICMS) initiative to acquire a single, commercially available case management solution that could be used by all federal law enforcement agencies to improve information sharing and collaboration between them and other local agencies.
According to court documents, the FBI and Colorado U.S. Attorney's Office was aware that throughout 2003 and 2004 IRP was actively engaged with the Department of Homeland Security and New York City Police Department and traveling the country to conduct CILC demonstrations to DHS, NYPD, Denver Police Department and many other agencies. CILC was the rage among U.S. law enforcement agencies and was featured in Law Enforcement Technology magazine in 2003 (http://bit.ly/2xspI9D) as well as Police Magazine in 2004 (http://bit.ly/2JwdCPm).
DHS information technology expert Paul Tran testified at the IRP trial that DHS was "interested" in CILC because "the software had a lot of features that law enforcement and case agents can really use." CILC is "powerful enough to become your agency's primary computerized investigative case management tool," said Police Magazine Reporter Sergeant Bob Davis of the San Diego Police Department who received a CILC demonstration. "We unite in praise to the IRP staff and their software product," said the Chief of Detectives for Denver Police Department in an email to IRP after a CILC demonstration. Sergeant John Shannon of the NYPD testified at the IRP trial that CILC was "cutting edge", "did a fantastic job of rationalizing the investigative process" and "was the best software he'd ever seen."
Mueller and the FBI were aware that on October 28, 2004, IRP was called to Washington, DC to demonstrate CILC to the joint DOJ/DHS FICMS working group where four senior FBI officials, including Supervisory Special Agent Melissa McRae, were in attendance with others from the Secret Service, U.S. Marshals, ICE, and Border Patrol. According to imprisoned IRP Chief Operating Officer David Banks who demonstrated the software to the FICMS group, Steven W. Cooper, who set-up the joint meeting, told him the FBI was "very impressed" with CILC.
Ten days later, on December 7, 2004, DHS requested and received a combined quote for two CILC modules totaling over $100 million dollars for DHS' 2005 budget exercise.
In a January 2005 hearing before Congress, Mueller addresses the failure of VCF.
On January 18, 2005, the FBI received an affidavit from Gary Hillberry, the retired head (Special-Agent-In-Charge) of the Denver division of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement who had been working as an independent consultant for IRP providing subject matter expertise on federal investigations with two other retired FBI supervisory special agents, sent an affidavit to the FBI stating: "IRP Solutions had a viable law enforcement product and appeared to be moving forward to acquire state and federal law enforcement contracts."
February 2005, Inspector General Glenn Fine releases a devastating 81-page audit describing the factors that contributed to the failure of VCF.
On February 3, 2005, the lead FBI agent overseeing the IRP case (John W. Smith), interviewed FBI Supervisory Special Agent Melissa McRae who was assigned to the Office of the Chief Information Officer located at FBI headquarters. ***Remember McRae was one of the FBI agents who attended the IRP FICMS demonstration on October 28, 2004. ***** McRae told Smith that CILC appeared to be "suitable for use" in an FBI field office.
Also, on February 3, 2005, Mueller goes on the record stating that the FBI will have a working product within a year and will be looking to purchase a commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) software product.
"The only COTS investigative case management product available in the market that was, as McRae described it, 'suitable' for FBI use, was CILC," says Cliff Stewart of A Just Cause.
On February 9, 2005, just six days after Mueller stated he would have a working product within a year and three weeks after Hillberry notified the FBI that IRP had a viable product, the FBI, armed with a fraudulently obtained search warrant stating IRP was a "purported software development company", raided IRP Solutions and spent 13 hours imaging every single hard drive in their company.
On February 25, IRP executives were contacted by Advocate Business Consultants inquiring about purchasing IRP Solutions on behalf of a mysterious third party.
On March 9, 2005, Mueller once again addressed Congress about the failed VCF, telling them the FBI would have something available soon.
"This isn't complicated," adds Stewart. "The timeline clearly shows the FBI was fully aware that IRP was a legitimate company, and by their own words, CILC was viable product," says Stewart. "There is no doubt the FBI obtained a search warrant under false pretenses to gain access to IRP Solutions for the purpose of stealing CILC and there is no competent evidence of a crime committed by the executives to rebut such a claim," concludes Stewart.
"I cannot shake my belief that an injustice has occurred with respect to their guilt," Judge Sarokin wrote in the Huffington Post. "The government's contention that their business was nothing but a scam defies reality," said Sarokin.
"This instance of wrongful prosecution didn't just damage individuals, families and businesses, it partially explains why after more than a decade of effort and the fruitless expenditure of more than a billion tax dollars, the security issues that left America vulnerable on 9-11 remain unsolved," wrote Dr. Bean. "IRP (The Investigative Resource Planning Company...had the answers," exclaimed Bean.
A Just Cause continues its fight for the release of five IRP executives from prison and vows to release other timelines in the near future, which will show the continuing misconduct by government officials occurring after 2005 to indict and imprison these men. For those who want more specific actions of government officials, A Just Cause recently published a comprehensive dossier of prosecutorial and judicial misconduct that can be viewed online (http://bit.ly/2wBaCyJ). Both Judge Sarokin's writings and Dr. Bean's report are included as Internet links in the dossier.